Abstract. In many countries organized as federations, fiscal equalization schemes have been implemented to mitigate vertical or horizontal imbalances. Such schemes usually imply that the member states of the federation can only partly internalize (marginal) tax revenue before redistribution. Aside from the internalized marginal revenue, referred to as the marginal tax-back rate, the remainder is redistributed. We investigate the extent to which state-level authorities in such federation under-exploit their tax bases. By means of a stylized model, we show that the member states have an incentive to align the effective tax rates on their residents with the level of the marginal tax-back rate. We empirically test the model using state-level and micro-level taxpayer data, OLS regressions and natural experiments. Our empirical findings support the results from our theoretical model. Particularly, we find that states with a higher marginal tax-back rate exploit the tax base to a higher extent.
INTRODUCTION
Fiscal equalization schemes are an important feature of public finance frameworks and are common in federal systems of government. Countries that have implemented fiscal equalization schemes include Canada, Switzerland, Australia and Germany. In the United States, there is no explicit federal equalization scheme for reducing fiscal disparities between the states. However, vertical federal-state transfers such as education programs aimed at the disadvantaged, food and nutrition programs and Medicaid have an equalizing component. Depending on the equalization scheme, unwanted incentives for state authorities may arise. Then equalization comes at the cost of efficiency.
The aim of the present paper is to show the relationship between retained local tax revenues (and so the equalization rate) and the auditing effort of the local tax authorities in a federal country. More precisely, this study investigates, both theoretically and empirically, the relationships between fiscal equalization and the enforcement of a uniform tax law in a federation where the member states are responsible for the enforcement of the tax and carry the related costs. In such a federation, tax enforcement might depend on the state-specific pecuniary returns of the enforcement activities. At the margin, these returns are determined by the state-specific tax-back rates (TBR). TBR is how much they can keep of any additional taxes levied after fiscal equalization (as opposed to being redistributed to other states or the federal government through fiscal equalization schemes). Even in the presence of a uniform de jure tax rate, states also may have de facto instruments to steer tariffs. These may include the incidence and intensity of tax audits, the interpretation of complex tax issues 1 and vague formulations in the tax code. 2 Using such instruments may create inefficiencies, violates the equal treatment of equals and in all likelihood undermines the tax morality of tax payers.
The features of the above-described incentive problem comply with the one in Germany: a highly equalizing fiscal equalization scheme, a uniform income tax law and decentralized income tax enforcement. This combination might be unique at present, but historically the case of China prior to the tax-sharing reform of 1994 is quite a perfect match for the same set of conditions, even though China was not then and is not currently a federal state. In a general sense, the incentive problem is also relevant to unitary countries that have decentralized over the last decades. This is also relevant for countries or confederations of states with centralized transfer schemes and decentralized tax systems such as the United States or the European Union.
Theoretical research on the incentives of fiscal equalization schemes and federalism in general has a long tradition. Pioneering works on the assignment of functions to different governmental layers and appropriate fiscal instruments date back to Musgrave (1959) and Oates (1972) . 3 The role of inter-regional spillover effects due to mobile tax bases or inter-regional externalities in the provision of public goods has been investigated in Oates (1972) , Boadway and Flatters (1982) , Inman and Rubinfeld (1992) or Manasse and Schultz (1999) . Other scholars have investigated asymmetric information over local preferences for public goods (e.g., Bucovetsky et al., 1998; Cremer et al., 1996) , over technologies for the provision of public goods (e.g., Akai and Silva, 2009; Boadway et al., 1995; Breuill e and Gary-Bobo, 2007; Caplan et al., 2000; Raff and Wilson, 1997) , and over local tax bases (Bordignon et al., 2001) .
In light of the above, we make a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the literature. On the theoretical side, we set-up a stylized Samuelson (1954) type model that reflects the characteristics of the federation described above. The model reveals that benevolent state-level planners align the effective tax burdens 1. For the interplay between accuracy and complexity of income taxation, see also Kaplow (1998) . 2. For example, in Germany, the level of expenses exceeding blanket allowances and qualified as deductible, despite some guidelines, is a decision ex aequo et bono of the auditing tax agent. An overview of several norms in the German income tax code with vague legal terms is provided in B€ onke et al. (2011) , Table A1 in the Appendix S1. 3. For a game theoretic analysis see De Figueiredo (2005) .
on their taxpayers with the internalized marginal tax revenue (IMR) collected from the taxpayers. The IMR is how much a state can keep from a marginal increase in the tax base after fiscal equalization. It is the product of two variables: the marginal tax rate of a tax payer and the state-specific TBR. The model shows that the effective tax burden of a given taxpayer will systematically vary with the tax-back rate of the state where the taxpayer lives: Provided that the substitution effect dominates the income effect, states with a higher IMR exploit the tax base to a higher extent.
On the empirical side, we use administrative German data to test the model implication that states with a higher IMR exploit the tax base to a higher extent. We perform two types of testing. The first type uses aggregated statelevel data, and studies how differences in average IMRs alter tax enforcement. Tax enforcement is measured by an input variable, the state-specific audit ratios: the number of income tax returns in a state divided by the state-specific number of full-time equivalent employees in the financial administration. The analysis of this input measure is also motivated by a report of the German Federal Audit Office (2006, p. 78f.) according to which differences in the personnel endowments of tax offices undermine the 'uniformity of taxation ' (Federal Audit Office, 2006, p. 122) . Consistent with the model, we find a negative statistical association between average IMR and audit ratio. The second type uses micro data on taxpayers and an output variable as tax enforcement indicator: the amount of income tax deductions granted to the tax units. The use of micro data allows us to disentangle the two components of IMR, the TBR and the taxpayer-specific marginal tax rates. Particularly, we perform two types of analysis. First, we run regressions of granted deductions on IMR that reveal the conditional correlation. Second, we exploit several natural experiments to provide causal evidence of the states' incentive problem. These experiments are based on observed discontinuities in the TBRs of some German states. Consistent with the model, we find that an exogenous increase in the TBR in one state lowers its tax enforcement activities compared with states that have a constant TBR. This is not the first study on the interplay between fiscal equalization and taxation. An overview is provided by Oates (1999) . Previous studies on fiscal equalization, taxation and the provision of local public goods include Zhuravskaya (2000) ; Bordignon et al. (2001) Libman and Feld (2013) . 4 Indeed, Bl€ ochliger et al. (2007) argue that equalization rates are 'one of the most debated issues in fiscal equalization' (p. 16), and continue: 'Lenient tax effort, especially if tax administration is under subcentral control, may (. . .) be a result of high equalisation rates' (p. 16). In the same spirit, Zhuravskaya (2000) argues that high equalization rates (in Russia) leave little incentive for subnational authorities to exert tax-generating efforts when transfers increase.
4. Another strand of literature focuses on tax enforcement and tax administration. Influential studies include Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) and Mayshar (1991) .
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The previous literature focuses on fiscal equalization and taxes passed at the local level. For example, Buettner and Wildasin (2006) find that US subnational authorities lower own-revenue generation in response to an increase in external grants. Mogues et al. (2009) find that in Ghana, own-revenue generation of subnational authorities is negatively related to the level of past external transfers. Our research, in contrast, focuses on decentrally determined enforcement activities in a federation with a uniform tax law. We are aware of only two studies with a similar focus: a theoretical work by Traxler and Reutter (2008) and a largely empirical work by Baretti et al. (2002) . Neither of the two provide causal evidence on the interplay between IMR/TBR and tax enforcement. With the present paper, we seek to fill this gap in the literature.
In sum, our major contribution is that we provide causal evidence on the fiscal incentives of member states of a federation using large-scale administrative micro data on income-tax returns for Germany from about 30 million tax units per assessment year, something that the literature has been lacking. Compared to aggregate state-level statistics or survey data, the administrative micro data provide a better capture and reliable measurement of the tax enforcement at the micro level. We find significant incentive effects i.e. we find a positive effect of the share of retained local tax revenue on the auditing effort of the local tax authorities. From the viewpoint of a single state, it is rational to align tax enforcement activities with retained tax revenues. However, this alignment causes fiscal externalities, and these imply that state-specific tax enforcement activities are inefficient from the viewpoint of the overall economy. In principle, such problems can be rectified by shifting the tax enforcement responsibility to a central tax agency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces Germany's federal system and income-tax law. Section 3 presents our theoretical model. Our database is described in Section 4. Section 5 provides the econometric analysis. Finally, Chapter 6 offers some concluding remarks. The Appendix provides further details on income taxation and fiscal equalization in Germany, the data and the empirical results.
FISCAL EQUALIZATION AND TAXATION

The basic mechanisms of fiscal equalization in Germany
Germany's federal structure is reflected by three levels of government: the federal (Bund), the state (Bundesl€ ander) and the local (Gemeinde) level. Since German reunification in 1990, sixteen Laender have comprised the state level and about 11,500 municipalities the local level.
Germany's federal system is cooperative: All the fiscally important taxes are set by the central government, and redistributive horizontal and vertical transfers are used to mitigate regional fiscal imbalances. As a result, the provision of (local) public goods and services is relatively similar across regions (Art. 107, Para. 2, 1, German Federal Constitution).
Basically, the fiscal equalization system has four stages summarized in Table 1 and detailed in the Appendix S5. Stage 1 is the vertical assignment of tax revenue to the federal level and the states, with fixed shares assigned to T. B€ onke et al.
each level. For example, 42.5 percent of the income tax revenue is assigned to the federal, and 57.5 percent to the state and local level. The stages 2 and 3 determine the horizontal equalization. At these stages, tax revenue is distributed between rich and poor states, determined by the state-specific 'fiscal capacity' and 'fiscal need'. Basically, fiscal capacity is determined by tax return per inhabitant (before equalization), fiscal needs by average tax return per inhabitant across all of the 16 states: any increase in a state's tax revenue either lowers the transfer entitlement (states with a below-average fiscal capacity) or increases the contribution obligation (states with an above-average fiscal capacity). Stage 4 determines particular vertical transfers from the federal to the state level (Appendix S5 for details).
In sum, Germany's fiscal equalization system drives a substantial wedge between state tax revenues before and after fiscal equalization. In case of the income tax, state-specific marginal tax-back rates (TBR) on income tax revenues collected by a state's tax authorities are usually < 25 percent (see Table 2 ). The remainder, the marginal rate of loss (1-TBR), is redistributed horizontally or vertically.
Determining the marginal tax-back rates
Due to the complexity of the legal regulations governing the fiscal equalization system, it is not feasible to express TBR by means of a simple closed form, say as a function of tax revenue, type of tax revenue and number of inhabitants (also 
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Baretti et al., 2002, p. 646) . 5 Also official data on state-specific TBRs are not available. Hence, we have set-up an accounting model depicting Germany's fiscal equalization law. The model is based on official statistics on the relevant information also used by the governmental institutions to assess the equalization transfers (tax revenue, population size, etc.). Based on these data, the model derives the actual and precise horizontal and vertical transfer flows. The TBRs are determined by computing the change in a state's actual tax revenue after fiscal equalization and in a hypothetical situation where the tax revenue before fiscal equalization is marginally increased -keeping everything else constant.
More precisely, our accounting model implements the German fiscal equalization law (Finanzausgleichsgesetz, FAG) for the period 1998-2004. The necessary federal and state-level information on tax revenues, population sizes, indebtedness, etc. are provided by the German Federal Ministry of Finance. 6 The model proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, the model determines every state's actual tax returns after fiscal equalization, R j , using the above-mentioned official information as input. 7 In the second stage, the state's actual income tax revenue The sizeable jump in Schleswig-Holstein's TBR requires an explanation. It arose from a particular value of Schleswig-Holstein's fiscal capacity relative to the national average. In 1998, both values were almost the same. In this particular constellation, the horizontal net transfer is zero, and TBR is determined solely by the initial assignment rule of the joint taxes (stage 1). This is the only constellation in which a state can experience a major swing in its TBR. Note that this major swing occurred despite hardly any changes in SchleswigHolstein's per capita GDP (see Table A1 ). Instead, the swing occurred from a coincidence: that Schleswig-Holstein's fiscal capacity in 1998 was equal to the 16 states' average. Another state with a sizeable change in TBR is Bavaria. Between 1998 and 2001, its TBR fell by more than 4 percentage points. In contrast to Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria's GDP increased in the same period (see Table A1 ).
The constancy of TBR in most states and its variability in two states means that the incentives for tax enforcement are constant over time in the former and change in the latter. This distinction will serve as the basis for our treatment analysis. For a rigorous treatment analysis, it is important that the TBR is an exogenous variable that cannot be purposely influenced by the state governments or tax administrations. As we will explain below, this is a plausible working assumption.
The first reason is that the key determinant of a state's TBR is its fiscal capacity relative to the average capacity of all states. Even if a state's tax authority had 8. We have not included the last wave for two reasons: a major reform of the system of fiscal equalization which changed the equalization scheme in general and hence the TBRs in all 16 states and a substantial income tax reform in 2005. 9. The sharp fall of Schleswig-Holstein's TBR from 1998 to 2001 is also consistent with the results of Huber and Lichtblau (2000) . In contrast to the TBR, Huber and Lichtblau (2000) report marginal rates of loss, which corresponds to 1-TBR. some power to steer the state's fiscal capacity, it is basically impossible for the same authority to perfectly steer relative capacity. Further, the relationship between a state's TBR and its fiscal capacity is highly non-linear with several kinks, making it even difficult for the authorities to predict how TBR varies with fiscal capacity. This can be seen from Figure 1a -c. These Figures show, by state and year, how hypothetical deviations from a state's actual per capita tax revenue before fiscal equalization change TBR. 10 Even for net-contributor and netrecipient states, the relationship is non-monotonic. For 'rich' states, TBRs are low because payment obligations increase sharply if tax revenue increases. For 'poor' states, TBRs are low because transfer entitlements are reduced sharply if tax revenue increases.
11
The second reason that makes it difficult for a state's authorities to control TBR is that it usually requires sizeable variations in per capita tax revenue before fiscal equalization to change the TBR. This is again reconfirmed from Figure 1a-c. As explained above, there is one noticeable exception. In 1998, Schleswig-Holstein's fiscal capacity before equalization was such that even a moderate change implied a substantial decrease in its TBR. This is because in 1998 Schleswig-Holstein's fiscal 10. In Figure 1a -c, the abscissa always gives hypothetical variations from a state's actual per capita tax revenue before equalization; the ordinate gives TBR. If the abscissa value is zero, then the hypothetical complies with the de facto per capita tax revenue, and the ordinate gives the state's current TBR. Negative (positive) abscissa values indicate the hypothetical per capita tax revenue before fiscal equalization is higher (lower) than the actual revenue (everything held constant). 11. Plachta (2008) provides a detailed description of the German financial constitution.
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capacity was sufficiently close to average fiscal capacity of all 16 states, meaning its horizontal net transfer position was zero (see explanations above).
The third reason for interpreting TBR as an exogenous variable is that TBR of a particular year is always determined before the tax declarations for the same year are audited. This is because horizontal and vertical transfers in a particular year, say assessment year 1998, hinge upon cash tax revenues. Income tax declarations from one particular assessment year, however, are handled by the tax authorities at earliest in the following year.
Administration of the income tax
The legislation and the enforcement responsibility of the income tax (and the other joint taxes) are assigned to different governmental levels. The tax-setting authority is assigned to the federal government. It defines both the income tax rate and its basis. The tax schedule is progressive: the average tax rate increases monotonically with increasing taxable income. During the period 1998-2004, the marginal income tax rate, depending on the assessment year, ranged from 0 to 53 percent. The tax base, taxable income, is gross income minus tax deductions and allowances. As the states have no tax-setting authority, even where 'pure' state taxes are concerned, 12 the states' ability to control the income tax revenues directly are severely restricted.
The responsibility for tax enforcement is delegated to the states. The decentralized enforcement of tax law at the state level and the monocracy of state financial executives open up opportunities for politically motivated application and interpretation of tax laws. This is because there are only basic standards in place to guide tax enforcement activities at the state level. Effectively, the state governments are free to decide on the funding of personnel and IT resources they will provide to their state tax agencies as well as on the training of tax agents. The state governments also give internal guidelines to their tax agents to help them deal with particularly vague paragraphs in the income tax law. Indeed, a report of the Federal Audit Office (Bundesrechnungshof) (2006) remarks: 'some states give the impression that the hiring of tax auditors is not interesting due to fiscal equalization; net contributor states had to pay the dominant part of eventual additional tax revenue in the fiscal equalization system, while transfers were reduced for the net recipient state'. In a summarizing statement in the same report, it is argued that differences in the personnel endowments of tax offices 13 undermine the 'uniformity of taxation in Germany' (Federal Audit Office (Bundesrechnungshof), 2006, p. 122) .
Further indications of politically motivated tax practices have been cited in previous literature:
1 Vogel (2000, 128-155) as well as Schick (2011) find systematic differences in tax revenue per audit and state-specific tax auditing frequencies.
14 12. Except the rate of the property acquisition tax that can be determined by the states since 2006.
13. See Table A1 in the Appendix S1 for details. 14. The city-state of Hamburg, for example, has a relatively high number of income millionaires whose income tax returns are audited at a substantially lower rate than in other states (Schick, 2011) .
2 Several governmental reports document substantial differences in quality of auditing and its intensity between tax offices and states.
15
3 To harmonize tax audits, an IT-based risk management system has been implemented in all tax offices across Germany. Its effects on auditing are discussed controversially.
16 4 Vogel (2000) provides evidence that some states favor certain tax payers by generous interpretation of amortization rules and the postponement of tax payments.
In sum, the states bear the costs of enforcing the income tax law (e.g., costs of operating state-level tax offices), but they internalize only part of the resulting tax revenues (due to the redistributive fiscal equalization scheme). The decentralization of administration results in limited means available to the federal government for controlling the tax-collection process. The states therefore, have both the opportunity and the incentive to align tax enforcement activities with their own objectives, and in this respect, TBR may play a prominent role. As outlined above, several state-level indicators suggest differences in state-specific tax enforcement levels. However, the empirical evidence is basically anecdotal and also lacks a rigorous econometric testing.
A STYLIZED MODEL
To understand the interplay between a decentralized tax administration and transfer schemes in a federation with a uniform tax law, we have set-up a static public good model in the spirit of Samuelson's (1954) . The model has strong assumptions, discussed at the end of this section, but should be considered as a useful tool to introduce the empirical analysis.
Consider a country with j ¼ 1; . . .; J federal states and let a state j have three sources of revenues: income tax revenue, 17 equalizing grants and lump-sum transfers, feasible for the provision of a state-wide public good provided at the level g j . Transfer rules determining the equalizing grants, Z j , and the lump-sum 15. Federal Audit Office (Bundesrechnungshof) (2006) reports that in a random sample of 21 tax offices, the number of tax audits per tax agent and year varies between 972 and 2,720. It is also documented that the complete and equal auditing of tax declarations is no longer ensured, and that systematic errors are made in the audits of special expenses in Hamburg (p. 35f.). According to the Audit Office of Berlin (2001), tax returns of employees are not audited with sufficient care, and tax agents fail to examine tax declarations carefully in an effort to meet thresholds regarding the number of daily audits. 16. The system evaluates roughly 2,500 items on income tax returns and indicates potential incongruities between the items. Harmonization was not achieved because the states modified the detection algorithms independently, and because tax offices responded differently to potential incongruities (Federal Audit Office, 2009, p. 176-179; Federal Audit Office 2012, p. 30) . If the system selects a tax return for special audit, it is not ensured that the auditing is conducted appropriately. Instead, according to several State Audit Offices, error rate range between 12 percent (North Rhine-Westphalia) and 52 percent (Brandenburg). 17. We abstain from modeling other tax types or the possibility of public debt to keep the analysis simple. The reasons and incentives for raising public debt are discussed in Jochimsen and Nuscheler (2011) .
Fiscal Equalization and Tax Enforcement transfers B j , and also the tax rate, s, are set by a central planner (whose goal might be the maximization of overall societal welfare). These rules, characterized by s;
, are decided before taxes have actually been collected, and before public goods have been provided. Mirroring the setting in Germany, we assume that tax enforcement is delegated to the federal states and each single federal state treats the function s;
We further assume that the tax units resident in a state j, i j = 1, . . . I j are immobile (and so are incomes, the basis of the income tax).
18
Using the public good as the num eraire, in a static one-period model, the public budget constraint of state j is given by,
with
where T j denotes income tax revenue after the initial assignment of taxes according to division rules in stage 1 of Germany's fiscal equalization system. The term r % 0:575 gives the share from income tax revenue assigned to the state level (including the state's municipalities), 19 and t i j s; y i j ; D i j is the effective tax burden imposed on tax unit i j . The effective tax burden of i j hinges on the exogenously defined progressive tax rate, s, 20 on i j 's gross taxable income, y i j , and the level of granted deductions, D i j . We assume that gross taxable income is exogenous from the tax agent's point of view.
The second term in the state's budget constraint is the net equalizing transfers,
For net-recipient (net-contributor) states, i.e., for states with a below-average (above-average) per capita fiscal capacity, the net equalizing transfer is positive (negative).
F accounts for further particular regulations inherent in Germany's fiscal equalization system, i.e,. the lump-sum transfers as described in Section 2.1. Across the states, equalizing transfers add up to zero, i.e.,
18. The assumption that citizens do not change residences across state borders in response to moderate differences in effective income tax rates is supported by a recent empirical study for Switzerland (see Liebig et al., 2007) . Young and Varner (2011) verify this claim for one state in the USA. However, Kleven et al. (2013) find evidence of high mobility of top income earners across borders. Such top-income households are not contained in the micro data used in our empirical analysis. If tax units, however, are mobile, this offers another argument for the states to lower the effective tax rates. 19. See Section 2.1 for details. 20. Mookherjee and Png (1990) address enforcement costs and optimal progressivity of income taxes. This study takes the tax rate as given.
The third term in the state's budget constraint (1), B j , are lump-sum vertical transfers, i.e., special needs grants.
For a tax unit resident in state j, we assume that preferences are characterized by an additive utility function of the form,
with c i j denoting the level of a composite private good and with g j denoting the level of a state-level public good. Accordingly, we abstain from modeling public good spillover effects. The budget constraint of a tax unit is,
and an interior solution exists. Further, suppose state planners 'act as benevolent maximizer of their citizens' welfare' (Edwards and Keen, 1996; p. 113) . Finally suppose the welfare of the residents of a state is described by a Bentham social welfare function,
The optimization problem of the benevolent planner of a state j is,
The solution is,
The benevolent planner of state j chooses D i j ; . . .; D Ã I j ; g Ã j so that the optimality condition (8) holds. The optimality condition is a modification of the standard Samuelson condition for the provision of public goods.
The left-hand side is the sum of rates of substitution between the public and the private good, known from the standard Samuelson condition. The expression in brackets on the right-hand side is one over the effect of a marginal variation in the tax base of resident i j , D i j , on the public budget of state j: the internalized marginal tax revenue, IMR i j . The IMR i j is determined by two terms. The first term gives the additional tax revenue resulting from a marginal tax base variation that is not vertically redistributed: the income tax share assigned to the state level, r % 0:575. However, state j can internalize only part of this amount because of the horizontal redistribution, captured by P , and the marginal tax rate of the taxpayer whose tax base changes with the level of granted deductions,
. Hence, in the empirical analysis, it is Fiscal Equalization and Tax Enforcement important to scrutinize the effect of TBR j on the level of granted deductions after conditioning for the tax payer-specific marginal tax rates.
Equation (8) has immediate implications for the optimal level of deductions,
, from the viewpoint of the benevolent planner in state j. Suppose there are two taxpayers with identical tax-relevant characteristics, i.e., identical marginal tax rates, living in two states -state 1 and state 2, taxpayers 1 1 and 1 2 . Further, suppose the states' tax-back rates differ, TBR 1 >TBR 2 . Under ceteris paribus conditions, condition (8) implies that then the level of tax deductions granted to taxpayer 1 1 should be lower than for taxpayer 1 2 . This is because the internalized returns from tax enforcement are higher in state 1 than in state 2. For example, the states can control the effective tax burdens by deciding how many tax returns are audited, or through the 'generosity' of tax agents in granting of tax deductions. The argumentation requires that the substitution effect dominates the income effect. 21 In any case, it is unlikely that substitution and income effects cancel each other out.
Equation (8) also indicates that the state planner does not consider the effect of tax enforcement on the budgets of the other states: Every variation in granted tax deductions alters the state's tax revenue ex ante to fiscal equalization, and thus, alters the revenues of all other states. This fiscal externality implies an inefficient level of tax enforcement in terms of overall costs and benefits to society.
The following empirical sections challenge equation (8) with empirical evidence. Except for a flat tax schedule, a rigorous empirical assessment requires tax-unit micro data. This is because individual marginal tax rates enter the optimality condition.
Of course, our model makes several simplifying assumptions. Particularly, we assume that federal tax agencies are purely self-interested. There are reasons to believe that there might be other determinants of tax auditing activities. For example, as tax agencies are controlled by state governments, political factors might influence auditing efforts as well (see Herwartz and Theilen, 2014) . Furthermore, as the main part of additional tax revenues goes to the central government, political alignment at the state and central government level might also influence tax auditing activities.
DATA AND KEY FIGURES
Micro-level data
Germany's Income Tax Statistic (Lohn-und Einkommensteuerstatistik) provides income-tax returns from about 30 million tax units per assessment year. It conveys information on taxable income, family situation, granted deductions and exemptions, revenues and sources of revenues, income tax burden, etc. From all the tax units, a 10 percent stratified random sample is made available for scientific purposes, the so-called Factually Anonymous Income Tax Statistic (Faktisch 21. It must also be ensured that variations in discretionary deductions and corresponding changes in income tax revenues have at most a small effect on TBR. As Figure 1a -c indicate, this is not a too strong an assumption. As pointed out in Section 2.1, in the empirical examination TBR is treated as exogenous.
anonymisierte Lohn-und Einkommensteuerstatistik, FAST). As the number of observations is rather high, at roughly 3 million tax units annually, we assume that the data are representative both for the national and for the state level. FAST is provided in the form of cross-sectional scientific use files covering data for the assessment years 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007 . More recent data are not available. This is for two reasons. First, tax units have an extensive period to file their income tax statements before the statements are audited and processed by the tax authority. For complex income tax statements, the whole process can easily take up to five years. Second, once the tax collection process is completed, the data is assembled by each state's statistical office and forwarded to the federal statistical office. Here the scientific use files are finally prepared. Our analysis builds on the cross sections up to 2004 only. This is because a major reform of the fiscal equalization scheme in 2005 changed the TBRs in all federals states, so that the assumptions underlying a treatment analysis are violated.
FAST allows the identification of gross taxable income before any type of deductions (y i ) and taxable income. The difference between the two income concepts is the sum of all granted deductions (D i ) and serves as the indicator of enforcement: the higher the granted deductions (D i ), controlling for all tax-relevant characteristics of the tax unit, 22 the lower the level of enforcement.
23
According to equation (8) from the theoretical model, the core variable for understanding the states' incentives to tax is the internalized marginal return. Table 3 (columns 1-3) provides the respective state-wide averages, av j IMR i j .
24
The higher av j IMR i j , the higher the internalized revenue and the higher the incentive to ensure effective tax enforcement. As can be seen from Table 3 , av j IMR i j differ substantially across states, ranging from 1.85 percent in 2004 in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania to 17.65 percent in Schleswig-Holstein in 1998. They also change over time. These differences arise for two main reasons. The first reason is state-specific tax-back rates. The second reason is differences in the state-specific distributions of tax-relevant characteristics (especially taxable income) and thus, in the marginal tax rates. Table 3 (columns 4-6) provides the state-wide averages of marginal tax rates. 25 Two patterns stand out. The first pattern is a decline in the averages of marginal tax rates over time. Most importantly, this decline is due to a lowering of the marginal tax rate of the top income bracket from 53 in 1998 to 45 percent in 2004. The second pattern is a 22. Our measure of enforcement, granted tax deductions, captures both tax enforcement of the tax authorities and tax compliance, driven by tax morale of the tax units. For the validity of our empirical analysis, it must be secured that the regional differences in tax morale are not systematically related with IMR and TBR. 23. Andreoni et al. (1998, p. 821) argue that deductions can be used as a measure for tax evasion behavior. Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1994) and Kaplow (1994 Kaplow ( , 1996 stress the administrative costs of monitoring deductions. Kaplow (1996) stresses the usefulness of using deductions as an indicator of tax enforcement strategies that has 'received little attention in the academic literature' (p. 143). 24. The state-and period-specific distributions of effective internalized marginal revenues (IMR ij ) are provided in Figure A3a -c in the Appendix S1. 25. Standard deviations of state-specific marginal tax rates can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix S1.
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difference in the period-specific state-wide averages of the marginal tax rates: For example, in 1998, it ranges between 31.7 percent in Hamburg and 25.6 percent in Saxony-Anhalt. Further descriptive statistics of FAST variables used in the following regression analyses are summarized in Table A2 in the Appendix S1. By year and state, the table provides means and standard deviations of the gross taxable income before any deductions, y i j , and total deductions defined as the difference between gross taxable income and the actual fixed tax base, D i j . All monetary amounts are expressed in 2004 prices. The table also gives the mean marginal tax rates and the number of weighted and non-weighted observations. Due to the factual anonymization, information on the process of taxation and state of residency is incomplete for several tax units, particularly for very rich ones. These units had to be discarded from the database, leaving us with a pooled sample of roughly six million observations (two million per cross section).
Gross taxable income before any deductions is the central micro-level conditioning variable in the empirical analysis. It has a profound impact on the level of deductions, and it is exogenous from the viewpoint of states' tax agents. Across the states, average gross taxable income is the highest for Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hesse, and the lowest in Thuringia. Over time, average price adjusted gross taxable income varies little.
The central endogenous variable in the empirical analysis is granted tax deductions. Average granted deductions for tax units in 1998, for example, range between €5,466 (Brandenburg) and €7,186 (Baden-Wuerttemberg). It is not necessarily true, however, that deductions are higher in richer than in poorer states. As an example, in 2004, average gross taxable income in Bavaria was about €1,500 lower than in Hesse, but average deductions in Bavaria were about €140 higher. The process of granting an income tax deduction usually has non-discretionary and discretionary elements. Non-discretionary in the sense that some amount of deduction is granted lump sum and based on automatisms following well-defined legal terms: Once a specific requirement is met (e.g., having a taxrelevant child or paying church taxes), the deduction is granted. This leaves little room for the taxmen to 'steer' income tax burdens. The discretionary element is due to vague legal terms. This leaves the taxmen some discretion concerning the interpretation of the case-relevant facts and thus the level of granted deductions. For example, the level of expenses exceeding blanket allowances and qualified as deductible, despite some guidelines, is a decision ex aequo et bono of the auditing taxman. 
Aggregated state-level data
The basic idea of the state-level analysis is to explain the state-wide level of tax enforcement with state-specific tax incentives after controlling for a set of state characteristics. Tax enforcement is measured by an input variable: statespecific audit ratio. Audit ratio is defined as the number of income tax returns in a state divided by the number of full-time equivalent employees in the financial administration of the same state. The audit ratio of tax administrations is our proxy for the overall financial and human resources endowments of tax offices.
The incentive to tax is captured by two variables. The first variable is the state-specific tax-back rates, the TBRs. The second variable is the average rate of internalized marginal revenues, av IMR ð Þ, as defined in Section 4.1. The set of state characteristics include real GDP per capita, the population density and the type of state (city-state [Hamburg, Bremen and Berlin] vs. non-citystate).
Summary statistics on the audit ratios of tax administrations and the state characteristics are summarized in Table A1 in the Appendix S1. The audit ratios differ across states and vary over time. For example, in 1998, the ratio was about 226 in Lower Saxony compared with 110 in Bremen. Over time, the ratio increased: in 2004, it was 280 in Lower Saxony and 240 in Bremen. This is a common trend in all federal states. Real GDP per capita is much lower in Germany's new (former East Germany) federal states than in the old (West German) states. It is highest in Hamburg (about € 50,000 in 2004) and lowest in Thuringia (about € 19,000 in 1998). Over time, real GDP changes little. The population density is highest in Berlin (>3,800 inhabitants per square kilometer) and lowest in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania (< 80 inhabitants per square kilometer), and exhibits some inter-temporal variation. 
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ECONOMETRIC RESULTS
Analysis with state-level aggregates
We start our analysis with a model using state-level aggregates in the spirit of studies such as Baretti et al. (2002) . The basic idea of these studies is to econometrically explain the state-wide level of tax enforcement by TBR, after controlling for other state-level variables. In particular, we measure tax enforcement by an input variable, audit ratio: the state-wide number of income tax returns divided by the number of full-time equivalent employees in the financial administration. The smaller the ratio, so the argument, the better the endowment of tax administrations, and the higher the enforcement level. Of course, a low ratio does not secure efficient usage of inputs in the tax collection process (output perspective), i.e., a low ratio can reflect both high inputs and highly effective tax men. Hence, the audit ratio might overstate the enforcement rigor as equalization can affect not only the productivity of a state's tax administrators (numerator) but also their number (denominator).
The state-level approach has two central weaknesses. First, economies of scale in tax administration are not well understood. In the presence of increasing returns to scale, highly populated states might enforce the tax law more effectively with the same staffing of tax administrations compared to less-populated states. Second, the approach does not control for differences in the distributions of individual IMRs across states (but uses a state-wide indicator). However, equation (8) indicates that the distribution of IMRs across a state's tax payers matters for tax enforcement. For these two reasons, results from a state-level regression approach should be viewed only as a preliminary na€ ıve attempt to study the incentives of Germany's federal system on the tax policies of the states. We implement two state-level panel regressions. In both regressions, the dependent variable is the inter-temporal change in the state-specific audit ratios. As audit ratios will respond to changes in tax enforcement incentives with some delay, the inter-temporal change in the audit ratio in state j is: audit_ratio j = audit_ratio j,2004 -audit_ratio j,1998 . 27 The definition of all the explanatory variables follows the same logic. Hence, the state-level regression is,
The change in tax enforcement incentives, DINCENT j , is measured alternatively as (a) change in tax-back rates, DTBR j = TBR j,2004 -TBR j,1998 (specification S1.1); (b) change in average rate of internalized marginal revenues, Dav j IMR ð Þ¼av j;2004 IMR i j À av j;1998 IMR i j (specification S1.2). Our expectation is that b 1 is negative: if tax collection incentives increase, states will secure a more effective tax auditing. In order to do so, the states might hire more taxmen and this, ceteris paribus, will lower the audit ratio.
Control variables include the change in gross domestic product per capita, DGDP j , the change in population density per square kilometer, DPOP j , and a citystate dummy, CITY. We have included DGDP j , because states whose gross domestic product increases relative to other states, in relative terms, increase their tax 27. The results for three-year differences support our findings from the six-year differences regarding the sign and magnitude of effects but are not significant at the 10 percent level.
bases and the budget of their public sector. This should translate into a better staffing of the tax administrations (lower audit ratios). We have included DPOP j for the reason that in states with a higher population density, it is easier to achieve economies of scale and scope in tax administration. If DPOP j > 0, the ratio of the number of income tax returns and full-time equivalent employees should increase. Last, with the distinction between city-states and no-city-states, we seek to control for the peculiar characteristics of these cities: high population densities, short commuting distances, and particular population characteristics (e.g., age structure, dependence on social welfare and unemployment, migration background).
The results of the two specifications are summarized in Table 4 . In the first specification, the regression coefficient of DTBR carries the expected negative sign: a higher incentive for enforcing the tax law means that the tax offices have more personnel for auditing the tax declarations of the residential tax payers, meaning that audit_ratio is lowered. However, the coefficient is insignificant. One possible explanation provides the optimality condition (8): tax enforcement depends on the tax-back rate together with the distribution of individual marginal tax rates. Accordingly, tax-back rates alone are not an ideal indicator of a state's incentive to enforce the tax law.
28 Specification S1.2 considers the interaction of tax-back rates and individual marginal tax rates by averaging the IMRs of all taxpayers in a state. Here, the regression coefficient of Dav(IMR) carries the expected negative sign and is significant at a 10 percent level.
In sum, the results of the state-level approach do not reject our research hypothesis that higher internalized returns of taxation lead to higher tax 28. This would to some extent explain the results in Baretti et al. (2002) , who fail to find a robust link between the marginal rate of loss and the level of tax enforcement.
Fiscal Equalization and Tax Enforcement enforcement activities at the state level. However, a state-level analysis misses the complexity of the condition (8): it is the distribution of IMRs over all the taxpayers in a state and not its average that determines tax enforcement activities. Not controlling for differences in the distributions of the tax-relevant characteristics of the tax units in regression analysis could easily lead to spurious correlations. Considering the distributions of tax-relevant characteristics at the micro level of tax units is thus crucial for estimating how fiscal equalization impacts tax enforcement activities of the states. 29 This can be best achieved by conducting a micro-level analysis at the tax unit level.
Micro-level analysis
On the micro level of taxpayers, we perform two types of analysis. The first type rests on the observation that the state authorities' incentives to tax differ between states and vary over time. In a nutshell, in line with the equation (8) from the theoretical model, we set-up a cross-sectional regression model with the level of tax enforcement, captured by the level of granted income tax deductions, as dependent variable, and incentives to tax, captured by the internalized marginal return, IMR, as the central explanatory variable. This type of analysis provides the conditional correlation between granted deductions and IMR. The second type is a treatment analysis and provides causal effects. It rests on the observation that the incentives to tax, captured by TBR, exhibit little inter-temporal variation for most states but vary substantially in one state, namely Schleswig-Holstein. Since TBR is an exogenous variable from the viewpoint of the states, the setting can be interpreted as a natural experiment and the residents of Schleswig-Holstein form the treatment group.
Cross-sectional regressions
The micro-level regression analysis is conducted with OLS. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the amount of tax deductions granted to an individual tax unit, i. Suppressing period, and state-level subscripts, the OLS regression is:
The bold expressions denote vectors. Error terms are clustered at the state level to correct for spatial correlation of error terms across countries. Incentives include a changing set of variables that mirror the tax enforcement incentives. Altogether four specifications are tested. In specification S2.1, Incentives comprises a single variable: the taxpayer-specific internalized marginal tax revenue, IMR. The specification, thus, complies with the optimality condition (8) from the theoretical model. To avoid endogeneity, i.e., to secure that the marginal tax rate is independent of the level of granted deductions, we proxy
ð Þ @D i j by deriving the marginal tax rate from a gross income before 29. Studies building on macro data instead proxy these and other issues with auxiliary variables such as an inequality index (e. g., Goodspeed, 2002).
any tax deductions (D i j ¼ 0). According to the model, we should expect a negative regression coefficient: the higher the incentive to enforce the tax law, the lower the granted tax deductions should be. Of course, to isolate the effect of Incentives on granted tax deductions, it is important to control for other potential determinants of granted tax deductions. To control for period effects, the vector Year includes two period dummies for 2001 and 2004.
Char comprises the characteristics of the tax unit: the number of tax-relevant children, age, marital status and church membership. Source is a vector of seven dummies. Each dummy indicates whether the tax unit earned income from a particular income source. This is because the German income tax law distinguishes among seven different income sources, and for each, there are particular regulations. A dummy is one if the taxpayer has some positive income from the particular income source; otherwise it is zero. To capture changes in the tax law, we interact the income source dummies with the two period dummies for 2001 and 2004. Finally, the vector State comprises 15 state dummies (base category is Baden-Wuerttemberg).
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We perform three tests for the specification of the incentive variable, Incentives. First, in specification S2.2, Incentives comprised of two variables: IMR and the marginal tax rates of each taxpayer. This specification tests for the role of IMR after controlling for individual marginal tax rates. Second, in specifications S2.3, Incentives solely includes the state-specific TBRs. Hence, S2.3 can be seen as the complement to the state-level approach in Section 5.1 (Table 4 , S.1.1). Third, in specification S2.4, Incentives decomposes IMR into TBR and individual marginal tax rate. Specification 2.4 is, thus, the most flexible specification, allowing TBR and marginal tax rates to have distinct effects on the level of granted tax deductions.
Results from the four OLS regressions are summarized in Table 5 . All four regression specifications tell the same consistent story: the higher the incentive to enforce the tax law, the lower the level of granted tax deductions is (controlling for all other aforementioned covariates). Specification S2.1 indicates an inverse relationship between IMR and deductions. This inverse relationship is reconfirmed in specification S2.2 even after additionally controlling for individual marginal tax rates. Specifications S2.3 and S2.4 show that both components of the IMR, the marginal tax-back rates, TBR, and marginal tax rates, matter for granted tax deductions, and that for both components, the inverse relationship is again confirmed. According to specification S2.4, the regression coefficient for TBR equals À0.034. Assuming that average granted deduction amount to €6,000 (see Table A2 ), the coefficient indicates that raising TBR by five percentage points lowers granted tax deduction by about €88.
We have implemented two robustness checks of our OLS results. First, it is not ruled out that the estimators for our Incentives variables pick up a time trend. Hence, we have re-run the pooled regressions separately for each cross section and specification to check if estimators remain significant also in the 30. Most importantly, the state dummies control for unobserved state effects on dependent variable. For example, the level of deductions may vary across states simply because of the composition of the state. T. B€ onke et al. *10%, **5%, ***1%. Data.
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single-period framework. 31 Second, TBRs for two states, Schleswig-Holstein and, to a lesser extent, Bavaria exhibit sizeable inter-temporal variation, while TBR of all other states change little. We have re-run the pooled and cross-sectional regressions without these two countries, to understand how these two particular countries impact the crucial estimators. 32 The results are summarized in Table 6 . Table 6 provides the results from regression specification S2.1 only. The first column provides the regression coefficient pertaining to IMR for the pooled data. The adjacent columns provide the coefficients for the cross sections. The first row shows the results for the complete set of countries, while subsequent rows deal with three reduced samples (discarding Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria, and both states). For all 16 constellations, the regression coefficient for IMR is consistently negative and highly significant. Further, excluding Schleswig-Holstein from the pooled regression seems to intensify the relationship between IMR and granted deductions, most likely because of the 1998 TBR outlier. Comparing the coefficients over single cross sections, the coefficients vary, yet they may pick up state-level effects, which cannot be controlled for in this framework (no inclusion of country dummies).
Treatment analysis
The treatment analysis exploits the fact that TBR is exogenous for the state authorities and varies systematically in some states but not in others. Tax FAST 1998 FAST , 2001 FAST and 2004 31. We have run regressions separately for each of the three cross sections (1998, 2001, and 2004) . The one-period framework does not allow a simultaneous incorporation of both tax-back rates and state-level dummies, and so, we have discarded the latter from the set of explanatory variables. The results are provided in Tables A3a-c in the Appendix S2, and confirm the results from the pooled three-period framework. Note, however, that the one-period estimates do not control for state-level fixed effects. 32. Because of the inter-temporal stability of TBR for the considered set of countries, the estimator is only identified by inter-state variation in TBR.
administrations in the former states can be viewed as the treated: their incentives to tax change over time. Tax administrations in the latter form the controls group, where incentives remain constant.
In our period of analysis, TBRs of two states changed markedly, Bavaria and, most noticeable, Schleswig-Holstein. In the latter state, TBR was atypically high in 1998 (of about 57 percent). Later it dropped to a common level of about 12 percent in 2001 and 2004. This treatment means weaker tax incentives and this should be reflected in higher tax deductions granted to tax units in SchleswigHolstein compared to residents in the control states. Bavaria's TBR between 1998 and 2001 fell by more than four percentage points. We interpret the case of Bavaria as a marginal treatment, but like for Schleswig-Holstein, we should expect an increase in granted deductions.
The econometric device to isolate the effect of the treatment is a difference-indifferences estimator (DiD). The DiD estimator is the difference between two differences: the difference in tax deductions before and after treatment among the treated, and the same difference among the controls. The control group should be composed of tax units resident in states with an inter-temporally stable TBR with tax-relevant characteristics similar to the treated. 33 The treatment in Schleswig-Holstein should lower the state's incentive to tax because it lowers the share of a marginal tax euro that can be internalized. Accordingly, the DiD estimator should carry a positive sign.
To establish experimental conditions, it is important to find adequate control states. By adequate, we mean that the TBR in the control states is constant over time and similar to that experienced by the treated state after treatment. Further, it is important that the tax units of the treatment and control states are comparable in terms of marginal tax returns. Otherwise, a uniform TBR does not guarantee an identical incentive to tax (see equation (8) in the model).
As can be seen from Table 2 , adequate control states are Lower Saxony and Rhineland-Palatinate. To achieve comparability of tax units and to isolate the effect of TBR, we restrict our control and treatment groups to tax units in the top income bracket (y i > 60, 000, respectively, y i > 120, 000 for joint filers). This restriction is important because of a change in the income tax rate between 1998 and 2004 lowering, among others, tax rates. The reform changed the distributions of marginal tax rates. It also changed the state-specific distributions of 33. Given that the dependent variable captures both tax compliance and tax administration, the results might not be generalizable to the rest of taxpayers (which is likely to account for the bulk of taxpayer returns). Hence, at first glance, it might be appealing to match individuals from all income brackets in terms of internalized marginal tax revenues. However, such an approach has three drawbacks that invalidate the analysis. First, matching tax units from different income brackets via IMR allows a matching of tax units with low-income (low marginal tax rate) from a state with a high TBR with tax units with high-income (high marginal tax rate) from a high TBR state, although their tax-relevant characteristics, and also their possibilities and incentives to declare deduction systematically differ. Second, the German income-tax code has changed over the period of analysis. Accordingly, one would match tax payers from different income brackets with different nominal tax burdens and thus, different incentives to declare deductions. Third, from a technical viewpoint, ranges of IMRs vary over time and states. So, there arises the issue of common support. For example, as Schleswig-Holstein's TBR was exceptionally high in 1998, the upper part of the 1998 IMR distribution cannot be not covered by the 2001 distribution.
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IMRs. By focusing on a group of tax payers with an identical marginal tax rate, we make sure that the common trend assumption is not violated and that incentives are properly captured by marginal tax-back rates, TBR.
34
Suppressing individual, period and state-level subscripts, we estimate the DiD for 1998/2001 using OLS,
The notation follows equation (10). The variable Treat is a dummy. The dummy is zero for all observations in 1998. For 2001, it is zero for residents of the control states and one for the residents of Schleswig-Holstein.
We performed three types of robustness checks. First, to test whether the DiD is not just picking up a time effect, we ran the DiD again for Schleswig-Holstein for the period 2001/4 when its TBR was constant. Presumably we should find no effect. Second, we performed pseudo-treatments as a quasi-falsification test. Pseudo-treated states are states with a constant TBR. For these states, we ran the DiD against other states with a constant and similar TBR. The main goal of the two tests is to rule out other state-specific confounding policies that occur at the same time as the TBR change. Finally, we ran all the DiD models after having reproduced the tax characteristics of the treated in the control groups with statistical matching. Because our analysis relies on repeated cross sections, we implemented the statistical matching across three groups: the treated and the nontreated in the initial period before treatment, and the non-treated after treatment (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008; p. 58) . Further information on the statistical matching, detailed regression results and additional robustness checks can be found in Appendix S3 and S4.
All the difference-in-differences estimators are summarized in Table 7 . Table 7 Results for Schleswig-Holstein appear in the first panel. For the period 1998/ 2001, we find a positive and significant treatment effect both for OLS and OLS after matching. This finding is consistent with equation (8) from our theoretical model: The drop in Schleswig-Holstein's TBR from 57.05 to 12.15 percent lowered the incentives to tax, and this implies a higher level of granted tax deductions. The average treatment effect of the treated (att) amounts to € 205 for the simple OLS and to €410 for OLS after matching. Alone for the rich tax payers in Schleswig-Holstein, the results from OLS/match indicate forgone tax revenues of 10.2 million euro. The difference in the estimates is due to the higher average gross income of residents in the control states before matching (see Table A4a ). For the period 2001/4 when Schleswig-Holstein's TBR remained stable, we find no significant effect. This can be viewed as supporting evidence that the DiD is not just picking up a time effect.
Results for the marginal treatment (Bavaria) and the pseudo-treatments are assembled in panels 2-6. In panel 2, we provide the treatment effects for the 34. Between 1998 and 2004 , the top marginal tax rate was lowered from 53 to 45 percent. This, however, should be captured by a common time trend and poses no problem. In panels 3-6, we provide results for four further pseudo-treatments. In all the constellations both the pseudo-treated state and the control states have a similar TBR. Further, it is guaranteed that the TBRs exhibit very little inter-temporal variation. The first constellation is Brandenburg, one of Germany's 'new' states, against the 'new' states of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, SaxonyAnhalt and Thuringia. In the three subsequent constellations, we assigned Brandenburg to the control states and always changed the status of one control state from control to treated. For all constellations, TBR remained stable over time, so that we expect to find no significant treatment effect. Indeed, this is the case for 10 out of 16 constellations. If Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania or Thuringia has the status of being treated, none of the effects is significant at the five percent level. Only for Brandenburg as pseudo-treated state are the results at odds with our expectations: Here, we find sizeable and significant positive treatment effects. One possible explanation is Brandenburg's proximity to Berlin: in contrast to the other considered 'new' states that experienced a substantial inter-temporal decline in their populations, Brandenburg's population remained stable over time. (see Table A1 ). At the same time, the audit ratio of Brandenburg's tax administrations increased, also in comparison with the other 'new' states under consideration: As can be seen from Table A1 in the Appendix S1, it rose from 172 in 1998 to 247 in 2004. The increase in Brandenburg's audit ratio indicates a deterioration of the staffing of its tax offices and can be seen as the infrastructure analog to the positive treatment effect for Brandenburg.
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The strength of the treatment analysis undertaken above is the identification of a causal relationship between TBR and granted deductions. It indicates that the tax authorities, indeed, respond to changes in tax incentives. The here proposed analysis, however, also has a week point. To establish experimental conditions, the analysis relies on countries with comparable TBRs and high-income residents. Hence, the results might not be generalizable to the rest of taxpayers. Generalizing the results by including all tax units and matching individuals from all income brackets in terms of IMR, the product of the TBR and marginal tax rates, may be tempting, but the idea has two obstacles. First, IMR distributions have different support across states and time. Particularly, for many residents of Schleswig-Holstein in 1998, it is not possible to find similar partners in terms of IMR. Second, tax reforms have changed the tariff, so that one would match tax payers over different income brackets with different tax characteristics (and abilities/incentives to declare deductions).
CONCLUSION
In many federations, fiscal equalization schemes have been created to mitigate fiscal imbalances across the member states. Various theoretical works have investigated the incentives of such cooperative systems. However, so far, only a few studies have addressed the research question of the present paper: whether fiscal equalization affects the enforcement of a uniform tax by state governments.
By means of a stylized model, we show that state authorities have incentives to align the effective tax rates of their residents to the internalized marginal returns from taxation. We empirically test the model using two approaches: regression analysis and a natural experimental design, and our estimates support the model's prediction.
Our empirical analysis suggests that a uniform income tax law de jure does not necessarily guarantee uniform enforcement of the law de facto. In Germany, it is the federal states that are responsible for the enforcement of the law. Our analysis reveals that the enforcement of the law, as measured by the level of granted income tax deductions, differs across states. The design of Germany's federal system offers a reasonable explanation. The system implies substantial differences in the state-specific marginal tax-back rates. As a result, some states can internalize a larger share of an additional tax euro than others, and this causes differences in the states' incentives to tax. The pooled cross-sectional regressions revealed that the level of granted tax deductions hinges on the share of tax revenue a state can internalize. The treatment analysis reveals that the states adjust the administration of the income tax to changes in TBR. Our prototype case, Schleswig-Holstein, experienced a substantial decrease in its TBR. Compared with the control states, this decrease translated into a significant increase in the level of granted income tax deductions.
From the viewpoint of a single state, it is rational to align tax enforcement activities with the fraction of additional tax revenue that the state internalizes. This rational is confirmed by our empirical analysis. However, the alignment causes fiscal externalities, and these imply that state-specific tax enforcement activities are inefficient (too low) from the viewpoint of the overall economy. Further, differences in enforcement activity across the states violate the principle of equal treatment of equals, undermining the tax morality of taxpayers.
In principle, such problems can be rectified by shifting the tax enforcement responsibility to a central tax agency. Indeed, several initiatives in this direction have been made in Germany in recent years. For example, in 2007 a commission of German experts on federalism ('F€ oderalismuskommission II') discussed the installation of such an agency. In the past, however, such initiatives have always been abandoned, or failed due to the resistance of German states.
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Potential reasons for the resistance include advantages of a decentralized fiscal agency system that are beyond the scope of our model (as for example, avoidance of fiscal dependency from central governments because of political alignment motivated policy; see Sol e-Oll e and Sorribas-Navarro, 2008). Furthermore, the argument in favor of centralization is based on the assumption that the theoretical tax rate is socially optimal and therefore should be fully enforced. Another reform option could be using an objective revenue capacity measure (such as the state economic product) in the equalization formula instead of actual tax collections.
